The hard bits of security are hard, but the easy bits aren’t. As infrastructure gets more dynamic, we need to make sure it isn’t everyone else redefining it.
Another week, another story about security.
Actually multiple stories about security.
And what’s upsetting with these ones are the fact that the fixes for them are already available.
I don’t cut-code anymore. I’m not a particular adept coder, and I think my code is a bit ugly. But I still know what bad practice smells like and what upsets me is how often we have repeat the mistakes of old.
Yes there are always deadlines, but if we’re working with advanced software defined infrastructures, then we have to restrict who can redefine those.
If you’re in a Product Manager role, don’t be afraid to ask what you’re doing for security, or what response plans are if something is compromised. Be mindful of the risk to your reputation or risk if you don’t give developers time to improve security instead of piling ever more features on. The mitigations for the most obvious attacks are documented, and usually relatively easy to implement.
And now to the details
Code Spaces had all their data wiped, we don’t know all the details but it sounds like:
- They hadn’t enabled 2factor auth on their AWS account
- Their backups weren’t to a different AWS account, or better still to another provider.
If you’re running a production service, and you’re hosting data for anyone else, then your backups need to be rock solid. Backing up to the same provider, in the same account, is like copying all the files from your desktop into a folder called “backup”. Sure you’ve two copies but when that disk goes bang they’re both gone.
And yes, 2 Factor is a pain when you’re logging into services, but if you’re hosting customer data that’s a pain you need to cope with. Providers usually let you set up many secondary accounts with reduced privileges, so use those tools to protect your services, and let people do just what they need in order to do their jobs.
On a similar theme people are leaving their AWS keys in android apps. Amazon offers a ticket granting service that’s ideal for this, but that’s more work, but work that you should be doing.
Some people aren’t even using those permissioning tools to embed keys with limited access, which just to reiterate, you shouldn’t be doing anyway. Instead they are embedding their main access key pair, which means that attackers could access and delete all data, and spin up thousands of instances just for fun/profit.
Security is hard, the recent problems found in libraries like OpenSSL are hard for an individual coder to work around, but decent libraries are still better than going it alone.
The 80:20 rule is ever present, will you ever make your app fully secure; unlikely. Can you prevent the most obvious attacks with application of best practices, which many programming languages can do for you; yes.
Don’t leave keys lying around, give apps or services any more permissions than they need, or use predictable IDs for sensitive data…
Do sanitise data you’re given, protect from XSS attacks, turn on 2-Factor Authentication for anything serious and always keep decent backups hosted on separate infrastructure…
These lists go on, but they not new: Best practice years ago, is still best practice now.